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REGULATING CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: THE 
NEW ROAD TO CONTRADICTION?t 
Sanford Levinson* 
POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION. By Eliz-
abeth Drew. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1983. Pp. viii, 
166. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $5.95. 
Few contemporary political issues pose more theoretical difficulties 
than that of the role of money in electoral politics. To what degree 
should individuals be free to spend their unequal resources within the 
political marketplace by, for example, running for office, supporting 
the candidacies of others, or simply communicating their views on is-
sues of the day through such devices as paid advertising in newspapers 
or magazines or radio and television? These are not merely abstract 
questions, of course; all campaigns for federal political office are today 
carried on within the shadow of federal legislation. Political cam-
paigns, including those for the Presidency, are significantly shaped by 
legislative attempts, as revised by judicial intervention, to control cam-
paign financing. 1 
While these rules governing electoral finance are beginning to rival 
the Internal Revenue Code in their complexity, Elizabeth Drew, one 
of our finest political journalists, has bravely sought to address them in 
her book Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption. Drew's 
close coverage of national politics in The New Yorker, in which this 
book first appeared, has been a constant source of illumination, and so 
t Many of the ideas in this review can be traced to conversations over the past four years 
with my colleague Lucas Powe, whose article, Mass Speech And The Newer First Amendment, 
1982 SUP. Cr. REV. 243, is a superb legal analysis of the issues treated in this review. I am 
extremely grateful to Charles Beitz for his valuable help in structuring this review. I appreciate as 
well the bibliographic aid of Dennis Thompson and Stanley Kelley, Jr. 
• Professor of Law, University of Texas. Ph.D. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1975, Stan-
ford University. - Ed. 
1. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (assessing the constitutionality of the 1974 amend-
ments [Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263] to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 
U.S.C. § 441a (1982)). It is worth mentioning at the outset that at present we are governed by a 
crazy quilt of statutes, well described by Justice White as "a nonsensical, loop-hole ridden patch-
work," Federal Election Commn. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 
1459, 1480 (1985) (White, J., dissenting), that have survived the scrutiny of a highly fragmented 
Supreme Court. Their survival has not, of course, ever been voted on, as a unified package, by 
even a single house of Congress. Unlike the majority in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108, I think it 
inconceivable that a rational legislature would ever have passed those parts of the amendments 
that survived Buckley in the absence of other important parts struck down as unconstitutional. 
For further discussion of Buckley, see text at notes 26-28 infra. See also Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979). 
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is Politics and Money. For example, Drew deftly points to the "loop-
holes" in the current version of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
loopholes that threaten the integrity of the regulatory process presum-
ably envisioned by supporters of the Act's 1974 and 1979 amend-
ments. Thus, the $1,000 limitation on individual contributions to 
candidates can only be understood in light of the fact that each sepa-
rate electoral "event" (e.g., primary, runoff, general election) is eligible 
for its own $1000 contribution (p. 12). Moreover, each member of a 
family may make separate contributions (p. 12); it is not unknown for 
youngsters to have a surprising interest in the election of certain 
candidates. 
Drew also mentions the loophole afforded by the legal ability to 
make unlimited contributions to state party organizations for use in 
"party-building" activities, ranging from the purchase of bumper 
stickers to get-out-the-vote drives. Although candidates for national 
office may not be mentioned directly in the state's party literature, 
they clearly benefit from general appeals on the merits of the party's 
platform. Few voters, driven to the polls ostensibly to vote for the 
state ticket, will fail to mark their ballots in the anticipated direction 
for Congress or the presidency as well. 2 This so-called "soft money" is 
playing an ever greater role in the electoral process. 3 
Drew's book, however, is more than a descriptive account of the 
travails of raising money for elections in contemporary America. She 
is also upset in a fundamental way by the role money plays in our 
politics, and what most strikes the reader of her short book is her great 
passion to stir us to action. 
Drew directs her hostility particularly at Political Action Commit-
tees (PACs), which amass contributions from individuals and then in 
turn supp'6rt candidates deemed favorably disposed toward the inter-
ests of the contributors. This support can take the form either of (reg-
ulated) contributions directly to candidates or of so-called 
"independent expenditures" not formally coordinated with the candi-
date and thus free from regulation.4 Indeed, Drew and others note the 
great pressures felt by candidates to be so deemed by particular 
2. See pp. 14-19. 
3. See, e.g., Pear, For F.E.C, Justice Delayed Is Routine, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1984, at E2, 
col. 3 (private nonprofit organization files complaint with Federal Election Commission alleging 
that both Democratic and Republican national committees improperly used "soft money" to 
influence federal elections). It is worth emphasizing as well that the regulations discussed 
throughout this review apply only to candidates for federal office. Thus, in Texas, for example, it 
remains the case that a single individual can (and did) give several-hundred thousands of dollars 
to particular candidates, including those running for state judicial office. 
4. The importance of PACs is a relatively new phenomenon in American politics. Ten years 
ago there were approximately 600 PACs; by the time of the election of November 1982, there 
were more than 3500 such committees registered with the Federal Election Commission, Most 
of the growth has taken place among P ACs sponsored by business corporations and trade 
groups. See Beitz, Political Finance in the United States: A Survey of Research, 95 ETHICS 129 
(1984), for an excellent overview of the empirical data on campaign finance. See also Briffault, 
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groups; one of the most effective ways by which an incumbent may 
gain such a reputation, of course, is by voting in desired directions. 5 
Drew is writing about an absolutely central problem, therefore, 
about which passion is appropriate. Yet I am afraid that, given the 
importance of the topic, she has written a book that is ultimately far 
too simplistic. One begins with the fact that her research seems en-
tirely journalistic, consisting of reports on the perceptions of people 
she has talked to. As Robert Samuelson pointed out in a superb criti-
cal review in The New Republic, 6 the book is devoid of any mention of 
the academic literature addressing the empirical dimensions of cam-
paign finance. 7 
Drew's failure to do adequate research would be less important if 
her normative arguments were more trenchant. However, as the bal-
ance of this review will try to show, her arguments are not at all well 
developed, and close scrutiny reveals some very troubling features that 
she fails to recognize and address. Politics and Money may ultimately 
be most useful in demonstrating how treacherously difficult it is to 
come to grips with campaign finance and how unhelpful it may be to 
rely on conventional shibboleths. 
I 
Money, as California State Treasurer Jesse Unruh said years ago, 
is the mother's milk of politics. Thus it was; thus it remains. The 
problem with the metaphor, however, is the potential malignancy of 
money relative to the political system that it purports to nourish. Cor-
ruption is the ever-present specter in a polity that makes election to 
office in part a function of the funds that can be raised on the private 
market. And, it is important to note, there are two distinct types of 
corruption at work. One is individual: individual candidates may sell 
themselves to the highest bidders. The other is systemic: the inequal-
ity of funds among candidates means that the well-funded can buy 
much greater access to the public forum than can the poorly funded. 
The "marketplace of ideas" therefore becomes an effective forum only 
for the rich and well-off. The political market becomes yet one more 
reflection of the distribution of income rather than of the distribution 
of ideas held by the individual citizens who constitute the polity. And 
The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election (Book Review), 84 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 
2083, 2094-97 (1984). 
Crucial to the growth of P ACs and their contemporary role was the invalidation by the Court 
of regulation of .. independent expenditures" in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59, further af-
firmed and elaborated in Federal Election Commn. v. National Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1465-71. 
5. See, e.g., Wines & Houston, Cangressmen Dispute Effect of Campaign Funds on Votes, Intl. 
Herald-Tribune, Aug. 11-12, 1984, at 3., col. 1. 
6. Samuelson, The Campaign Reform Failure, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 5, 1983, at 28. 
7. Id. at 28. See also Briffault, supra note 4. 
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placing exclusive or even predominant emphasis on the rights of indi-
viduals simply fails to recognize the importance (and priority) of de-
signing structures that serve social goals, including the goal of 
protecting individual liberties. 
According to Drew, the impact of money - and of raising money 
- threatens the very basis of our political system. Drew in effect in-
vites her readers to enlist in the "war" that Common Cause has "de-
clared" against PACs.8 She ends her book by saying, "We have 
allowed the basic idea of our democratic process - representative 
government - to slip away. The only question is whether we are seri-
ous about trying to retrieve it" (p. 156). 
It is not part of Drew's project to elaborate a legislative solution to 
the problems she is exposing. She does, however, endorse the sugges-
tion of Common Cause president Archibald Cox that "an election 
ought to be treated like a town meeting or an argument before the 
Supreme Court" (p. 149). Here one does not allow unregulated 
speech; instead, "everyone gets an equal allocation of time and a fair 
chance to express his point of view" (p. 149). (I put to one side the 
empirical accuracy of Drew's and Cox's analogies. Surely, though, 
Cox is experienced enough to know that equality of time is often the 
only equality observed in representation before the Supreme Court.) 
Thus, Drew joins other writers who hold that it is permissible to 
restrict private political giving in order to guarantee fair representa-
tion in the public forum for all positions that enjoy significant public 
support.9 She is also representative of at least one branch of main-
stream liberal opinion, typified by Common Cause, in her relatively 
cavalier dismissal of the Supreme Court's use of the first amendment 
as a shield against comprehensive regulation of campaign finance. 
Drew's positions are similar, for example, to those expressed by 
Judge J. Skelly Wright in an important article condemning "the sti-
fling influence of money in politics."_10 "Unchecked political expendi-
8. See A Declaration of War, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, at El 8, col. 1 (advertisement placed 
by Common Cause, concluding with the statement, "Common Cause has declared war - a war 
on PACs."). 
9. See, e.g., Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle 
to Political Equality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982); Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their 
Priority, 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 3 (1982). See also Brilfault, supra note 
4. For a legal response to arguments like those presented in these articles, see Powe, Mass Speech 
And The Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. Cr. REV. 243. See also the excellent critique of 
Drew and Wright presented in Fleischman & McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: 
Toward a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J. L. & Pol. 211 (1984), in which restric• 
tions on campaign spending are analyzed as attempts to achieve equality by "leveling down." 
Fleischman and McCorkle would attempt to achieve some of the same goals by "leveling up" 
through enhanced public financing of elections. However, public subsidies would serve as only a 
"floor" on campaign spending rather than become the "ceiling" that would result from the limi-
tations sought by Common Cause and defended by Wright and Drew. Unfortunately, their arti-
cle appeared too late to be considered in the preparation of this review. 
10. Wright, supra note 9, at 636. 
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tures, no less than crass regulation of ideas, may drown opposing 
beliefs, vitiate the principles of political equality, and place some citi-
zens under the damaging and arbitrary control of others." 11 Thus, 
limitation of the ability of the wealthy to spend their money publiciz-
ing their political views serves to "enhance[ ] the self-expression of 
individual citizens who lack wealth, furthering the values of freedom 
of speech."12 
John Rawls, surely the most distinguished contemporary liberal 
philosopher, has attempted recently to provide philosophical support 
for views like those set out by Wright and Drew.13 Defending what he 
calls, borrowing from Kant, regulation of "[t]he public use of our rea-
son,"14 Rawls argues that "valid claims- of equal citizens are held 
within certain standard limits by the notion of a fair and equal access 
to the political process as a public facility." 15 
Instead of talking about "drowning," as does Judge Wright, Rawls 
adopts the metaphor of "limited space" to make the same point: 
"[T]hose with relatively greater means can combine together and ex-
clude those who have less" from the limited space of the political pro-
cess.16 A just state therefore not only can but must structure political 
liberty to make it impossible for such exclusions to take place. An 
uncontrolled electoral marketplace has no more merit than the now 
discredited uncontrolled economic market. "In both cases the results 
of the free play of the electoral process and of economic competition 
ate acceptable only if the necessary conditions of background justice 
are fulfilled." 17 
According to Rawls, legitimate regulation of campaign finance re-
quires that three conditions be met. The first is a requirement of con-
tent neutrality. Any regulation must therefore "favor no political 
doctrine over any other."18 Secondly, the regulations cannot "impose 
any undue burden on the various political groups in society and must 
affect them all in an equitable manner."19 Although Rawls clearly 
11. Id. at 637. 
12. Id. 
13. Rawls, supra note 9. 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. Id. at 43. 
16. Id. This passage will remind law-trained readers of the "scarcity" rationale which has 
been used to support the "fairness doctrine" applied by the Federal Co=unications Co=is-
sion to the broadcasting industry over the past five decades. See generally National Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943); S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND 
THE MEDIA (1978). That doctrine is, of course, extremely controversial, and it has largely been 
repudiated by the FCC. The unsatisfactory experience with the fairness doctrine as actually 
applied to the broadcast industry affords a further set of problems for those who would regulate 
"the limited space of the political process." 
17. Rawls, supra note 9, at 78. 
18. Id. at 73. 
19. Id. 
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recognizes that defining an "undue burden" is itself controversial, he 
nonetheless states unequivocally that "the prohibition of large contri-
butions from private persons or corporations to political candidates is 
not an undue burden (in the requisite sense) on wealthy persons and 
groups."20 A ban on such contributions may be required "so that citi-
zens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of 
influencing the government's policy and of attaining positions of au-
thority irrespective of their economic and social class."21 Finally, the 
regulations must be "rationally designed"22 to guarantee everyone a 
"fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of 
political discussions."23 Such regulations are "unreasonable" if less 
restrictive, equally effective regulations are available.24 
Judge Wright, like Rawls, condemns several recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court made "in the name of the liberties of the first amend-
ment," which nevertheless lead to "the underpinnings of our demo-
cratic system . . . being menaced . . . ."25 The most important of 
these decisions, of course, is Buckley v. Valeo, 26 in which a thoroughly 
fragmented Court upheld limitations on the amount that one could 
contribute to a political candidate while simultaneously striking down 
those parts of the 1974 campaign finance amendments limiting the 
amounts that a candidate could spend on a political campaign.27 
The rationale justifying the contribution limitation ($1000 by an 
individual, $5000 by a PAC) was the prevention of individual corrup-
tion; society has a valid interest in attempting to prevent the "buying" 
of a candidate. But the majority rejected the notion of "systemic" cor-
ruption. Thus, as to wealthy candidates who contribute to their own 
campaigns, the majority noted that persons cannot corrupt them-
selves. And it sharply denounced the egalitarian rationale articulated 
by Judge Wright: "[T]he concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... "28 
We are, therefore, presented with a sharp conflict between a gener-
20. Id. 
21. Id. Rawls offers in contrast "re,gulations that restrict the use of certain public places for 
political speech." Such regulations might well "impose an undue burden on relatively poor 
groups accustomed to this way of conveying their views since they lack the funds for other kinds 
of political expression." Id. at 73-74. 
22. Id. at 74. 
23. Id. at 42. 
24. Id. at 74. 
25. Wright, supra note 9, at 645. 
26. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
27. Buckley also invalidated a provision that attempted to limit the ability of individuals or 
groups to spend money "independently" promoting a candidate. Several of the P ACs have since 
gained fame or notoriety from engaging in such "independent" campaigns. 
28. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
February 1985] Regulating Campaign Activity 945 
ally conservative Supreme Court majority,29 on the one hand, and 
some of the most noted liberal judges and philosophers of our age. 
Yet, however eminent those latter authorities may be, there are good 
reasons to be wary of their counsel, whether legal or philosophic. The 
implications of their views for the theory of freedom of speech are 
troubling indeed. 
II 
Overtly, justifying restriction of campaign spending by reference to 
the idea of fair access to the public forum may seem content neutral. 
However, it is worth considering to what extent we in fact support 
such restrictions because of tacit assumptions about the contents of the 
views held by the rich, who would obviously feel most of the burden of 
the restrictions. 
If both political views and the propensity to spend money on poli-
tics were distributed randomly among the entire populace, it is hard to 
see why anyone would be very excited about the whole issue of cam-
paign finance. It is only because we know there is no such randomiza-
tion that we are concerned about spending by the rich. That is, we 
believe that they think differently from the rest of us, and that they are 
willing to spend their money to convince us that we ought to accept 
their views. It would presumably be unacceptable (and would violate 
any plausible conception of the first amendment) to state flatly that the 
rich cannot articulate their benighted views in public. It is viewed as 
less problematic, however, to say that a group of people likely to have 
view X (i.e., the rich) cannot use their money to purchase the distribu-
tion of their views by such means as advertising them directly or con-
tributing to candidates willing to support view X 
Setting aside the question of content neutrality, the deeper issue is 
whether Drew's position can be defended on any principle we are pre-
pared to accept and to apply consistently. She presumably holds that 
no one ought to be able, simply by virtue of having money, to make it 
possible for a candidate to purchase an advertisement in the New York 
29. As Powe has pointed out, supra note 9, at 270, Justices Brennan and Marshall, generally 
regarded as the most ardent civil libertarians on the Court, voted in favor of the restrictions, 
while Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, the two most conservative members, would 
have invalidated the amendment in toto. He suggests that what is really being tapped in the 
campaign finance cases is the attitude of the judges toward equality. The liberal egalitarians thus 
support the right of the state to try to diminish the impact of economic inequality on the political 
market, while pro-business or anti-egalitarian conservatives sing the praises of the individual 
rights protected by the first amendment. 
Powe is not suggesting any kind of conservative conspiracy. Indeed, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, not usually regarded as a bastion of conservatism, is at the head of those opposing 
the constitutionality of most campaign finance regulation. The rather bitter struggle between 
Common Cause and the American Civil Liberties Union itself illustrates a central split in tradi-
tional liberal circles. 
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Times or on television in order to articulate her views.30 It would 
seem, then, that the only corrective against allowing money to distort 
the marketplace is to limit everyone to the same relatively low level of 
spending.31 
I have no affirmative desire to let money structure the political 
marketplace. But good intentions do not suffice to generate cogent 
arguments - or policy. For if one accepts the goal of limiting the 
impact, to use Michael Walzer's term, of the "sphere" of money on 
the functioning of the polity,32 how does one at the same time justify 
the ability of those particularly wealthy individuals who own newspa-
pers and other media to influence the political process to the extent 
they do? "The potential reach of newspapers is great and it may well, 
as FDR so clearly realized, not represent many voters."33 
As A.J. Liebling pointed out many years ago, the only person with 
freedom of the press is the person who can afford to own one. It may 
be that the rich sometimes prefer to purchase newspapers instead of 
yachts because they are aware of the utility of the former to maintain-
ing a social consciousness that allows them to amass and keep enough 
money to buy the latter. The sphere of money overlaps with the sphere 
of ideas and the formation of consciousness. That some owners, of 
course, "allow" their editors freedom to write whatever editorials they 
choose does not gainsay the relationship between money and ideas ac-
tually found in a newspaper. 
One can only guess at the market value of a newspaper's endorse-
30. Indeed, the 1974 amendments would have prevented the individual from purchasing the 
advertisement on her own if it served to support an identifiable candidate. See note 27 supra. 
31. "Low" may be misleading here, since a $1000 limit, especially when multiplied by the 
kinds of "loopholes" described by Drew, still gives the well-off a distinct advantage in influencing 
the political process. Indeed, calls for public financing of elections come primarily from those 
who believe that all private financing of elections must be eliminated if the political process is to 
be truly egalitarian. 
32. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). Walzer quite remarkably says nothing of 
significance about campaign financing in his extensive analysis of the extent to which inequalities 
of income or wealth can legitimately be reflected in the ability to enjoy various goods of life, 
ranging from medical care to education to yachts. He is quite happy to let the rich enjoy their 
yachts or skiing vacations even as he rejects the legitimacy of their greater access to first-rate 
medical care. Walzer discusses ail of the issues already mentioned in addition to problems such 
as the Indian caste system, methods of collecting garbage, and the role, if any, of justice in 
constraining (or providing) one's access to love and sex. Nonetheless, his sole comment about the 
connection between money and politics is limited to the observation that "the struggle against the 
dominance of money [in politics] .•• is perhaps the finest contemporary expression of self-
respecL" Id. at 311. 
33. Powe, supra note 9, at 268. One can use Buckley and NCPAC, of course, to argue that 
newspaper "contributions" are free from regulation because they are "independent," i.e., not 
made directly to the candidate. However, not only did Common Cause vigorously promote and 
defend the regulation of "independent" expenditures in the 1974 amendments, but at least two 
Justices, White and Marshall, have upheld the constitutionality of such regulation. See Federal 
Election Commn. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1474-81 
(1985). They, at least, might consider more fully what the boundaries of their pro-regulation 
positions might be. And, even if the issue seems temporarily settled as a matter of positive law, 
that scarcely means that the political or theoretical debates have been equally stilled. 
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ment of a candidate, especially if the preference is supplemented by 
biased coverage in the rest of the paper that in effect may make it 
impossible for a candidate to present her views to the electorate. 
Thus, William Loeb contaminated New Hampshire politics for years 
because he owned the Manchester Union-Leader and used both its 
"news" pages and its editorials as outlets for his ultra-conservative 
(and sometimes anti-Semitic) political views.34 If his access to the 
public, which was solely a function of his money, was not subject to 
regulation, then why is the situation different for other well-off people 
who wish to put their money into contributing to candidates, either 
directly or "independently, " rather than buying newspapers or televi-
sion stations?35 
I do not mean the foregoing as a purely rhetorical question. Mark 
Tushnet has indeed argued that the original intention of the first 
amendment was to protect individual pamphleteers and publishers. 36 
Today, however, the primary beneficiaries of the first amendment are 
not marginal individuals but media corporations. According to 
Tushnet, "[T]he First Amendment, usually thought of as a vehicle by 
which otherwise powerless people can gain power, became another one 
of the assets held by the powerful."37 Thus, he argues, media corpora-
tions should be subject to regulation as much as any other agglomera-
tion of capital that poses threats to the possibility of genuine 
democratic governance. 
To the extent that it strikes us as dubious - or indeed "unthink-
able" - to limit the ability of a newspaper to campaign actively for its 
favorite candidates, then we should at least question why it would be 
any more legitimate to limit the amount of spending by an individual38 
eager to support the same candidate. Perhaps at this point one might 
answer by reference to the possibility of corruption, as candidates sell 
34. See K. CASH, WHO THE HELL is WILLIAM LoEB? (1975). Another newspaper owned by 
William Loeb, the New Hampshire Sunday News, titled one of its editorials "Kissinger The 
Kike?." New Hampshire Sunday News, Sept. 2, 1973, at 34, reprinted in id. at appendix D. 
35. "If a newspaper is allowed to reach and propagandize so many readers, why should 
citizens be prevented from . • . trying to counter it?" Powe, supra note 9, at 268. 
36. Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW 253, 256-57 (D. 
Kairys ed. 1982). 
31. Id. at 257. Tushnet more recently has described the first amendment "as the primary 
guarantor of the privileged." Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1387 (1984). 
38. Especially if the spending were subject to public disclosure above a certain amount. I 
should note that the disclosure issue raises important problems of its own. I personally oppose 
Buckley's upholding mandatory disclosure of any contribution of $100 or over; I believe that 
$100, in today's economy, is a genuinely low amount and that ordinary men and women might 
well be deterred from contributing to unpopular groups or candidates for fear of the conse-
quences of public disclosure. I am not worried about the "chilling effect" on those who can 
afford to contribute $5000, since they almost undoubtedly have sufficient economic resources to 
protect themselves against the threat of economic retaliation that is one of the central motivating 
concerns behind protection of electoral secrecy. Fuller treatment of disclosure requirements, 
however, is beyond the scope of this review. 
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their souls to the highest bidders. However, it is certainly plausible to 
imagine such corruption occurring equally within the process of a des-
perate candidate seeking the support of the local newspaper owner or 
editor. Again, it is hard to cabin the pro-regulation argument in any 
way that leaves the press magnate singularly free of the restrictions 
placed on others. 
III 
Money is not the only socially useful resource that is unequally 
distributed. Consider the following example, obviously drawn from 
Robert Nozick's classic hypothetical in Anarchy, State, and Utopia:39 
Imagine that Wilt Chamberlain wishes to participate actively in the 
political campaign of his favorite candidate for federal office. He first 
offers this candidate $50,000, only to be told that such a contribution 
would violate federal law, which limits contributions to individual 
candidates to $1000 and the maximum total of contributions to all 
candidates by each contributor to $25,000.40 Wilt then hits upon the 
following idea: He will tour the country on behalf of the candidate, 
and before each of the candidate's speeches, he will put on a special 
"dunking" exhibition. Anyone who wishes to attend will be required 
to drop five dollars into a box labelled "Candidate Contributions." At 
least 10,000 people are willing to pay the five dollars, and $50,000 
thereby enters the candidate's coffers. Or, leaving money out of the 
hypothetical entirely, assume only that the candidate will draw a 
much larger audience if Chamberlain (or Robert Redford) appears. 
Without the celebrities, only 1000 people would show up; with them, 
5000 persons show up to see the celebrity (and hear the message). 
Celebrity is obviously not an equally distributed attribute. And 
one actual consequence of the so-called reforms passed in 1974 is to 
increase even further the power of celebrities, exemplified by the trans-
formation of astronauts and movie stars into senators and presidents.41 
Indeed the 1988 Presidential race threatens to boil down to a contest 
between former football star Jack Kemp and his basketball counter-
part Bill Bradley, both of whom have been clearly aided in their polit-
ical careers by their celebrity status that assured them name 
39. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 161-63 (1974). 
40. But see notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text as to the reality of the $1000 limitation; 
Wilt could, of course, contribute the $50,000 to the Texas Republican Party for a voter registra-
tion drive. 
41. One is reminded of Howard Metzenbaum's complaint, when he was accused of spending 
too much of his own money in his campaign against John Glenn that he (Metzenbaum) had not 
had the benefit of getting billions of dollars worth of name recognition provided at government 
expense via the space program. I should make clear that the rise to political prominence of 
Glenn and Ronald Reagan preceded the 1974 reforms, though I do believe that they exacerbated 
the particular advantages enjoyed by celebrities. In fact, had the Court in Buckley upheld the 
provisions limiting candidates' spending on their own behalf, celebrities would have enjoyed an 
even greater windfall within the political marketplace. 
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recognition and media interest. And, of course, celebrities can play a 
significant role in politics even as they decline to run for office and 
merely lend their support to others. 
The candidate with the ability to attract Paul Newman to his en-
tourage - just as the defendant who can afford to hire Edward Ben-
nett Williams - is significantly advantaged in the relevant 
marketplace. Presumably it would be bizarre to tell the Newmans of 
the world that they could not actively participate in the political world 
because the resource they contribute - their celebrity - is so much 
greater than that of the average citizen. 
Perhaps the reason that we do not in fact move toward some no-
tion of equality of celebrity resources is the plausible assumption that 
celebrities' political views are randomly distributed. For every Paul 
Newman who supports Walter Mondale, there is a Carole King who 
supports Gary Hart - and a Frank Sinatra who supports Ronald 
Reagan. The "invisible hand" does appear to remove any structural 
imbalance that might otherwise be caused by the participation of ce-
lebrities at least in conventional politics.42 
As political sociologists have pointed out, a key variable in explain-
ing political participation is disposable time.43 That, too, is an un-
equally distributed resource. People who must work forty-hour jobs in 
order to support themselves and their loved ones have comparatively 
little time left over to engage in active politics.44 Those who are inde-
pendently wealthy can afford to "buy time" and run for office, as is 
increasingly happening. Among the less wealthy, however, disposable 
time is a resource likely to be available only to such groups as college 
students and retired people. Here, of course, we get much farther 
away from calming notions of randomization in the distribution of 
opinions. To allow the retired to work eight hours a day on politics, 
while the rest of us must hold regular jobs, is to allow as well signifi-
cant inequalities in the practical ability of certain ideas to be presented 
to the voting public. This may help to explain why few politicians are 
willing to risk serious criticism of the social security system.45 And 
the peculiar role played by activist students may equally help to sug-
gest why anti-student ideas, whether they be the reinstitution of the 
42. This last caveat is based on the recognition that few celebrities embrace unconventional 
or radical politics, aware as they are of the past reality, and future possibility, of blacklists and 
other attacks on their status. But of course few analysts of campaigns in America genuinely 
focus on the absence of radical alternatives to the shared visions of the Democratic and Republi-
can parties. 
43. See, e.g., J. WILSON, PoLmCAL ORGANIZATIONS 58-59 (1973) ("[S]ome persons have 
more of those resources, chiefly money and personal control over time schedules, that enable 
them to join more associations than are joined by those Jacking such resources."). 
44. Though, "[i]n a nice twist on Anatole France, the employed as well as the unemployed 
are free to take time away from their jobs." Powe, supra note 9, at 263 n.88. 
45. See Shirbman, Senior Citizens Mobilize to Block Plan to Curb Social Security Benefit 
Rises, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1985, at 62, col. 1: 
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:939 
draft or the raising of tuition fees, may be "drowned out" of the public 
dialogue. 
It is also worth mentioning the general finding of almost all polit-
ical sociology that political activists tend to be drawn from the most 
"ideological" ends of their respective political parties.46 Just as finan-
cial contributors to political candidates tend to be atypical of the pol-
ity at large,47 so is there good reason to believe that non-financial 
contributors may have their own particular axes to grind. I am not 
particularly bothered by this, though Drew may be; she seems to 
count it against P ACs that many of them have "an ideological bent" 
(p. 13). In any case, the process by which we draw campaign workers 
is scarcely "neutral" in its impact on the political process. 
IV 
Consider, then, a proposal designed to overcome some of these 
non-monetary structural biases that exist in the unregulated market-
place: Everyone will be limited to an equal quantum of political activ-
ity. The amount must, of course, be kept suitably low in order to 
prevent the kind of formal equality so endemic to (some versions of) 
liberalism by which the rich and poor alike are permitted to spend a 
million dollars a year on politics. Therefore, no person will be allowed 
to spend more than two hours a week (or 100 hours per year) on polit-
ical activity. Clearly, it would be hard to imagine a proposal more 
offensive to traditional civil libertarians. 
The almost intuitive offensiveness of this proposal presumably de-
rives from the perception that the limitation of liberty here is so pa-
tently directed at an individual's own expenditure of personal energies. 
It is she herself who wishes to knock on doors, march in parades, stuff 
envelopes, pass out handbills, or speak in the park. And, further, we 
Most seniors are retired, and thus are doubly potent as lobbyists on issues such as Social 
Security; they have grown dependent on their monthly checks, and they have the free time 
to write letters to members of Congress, to visit them and to organize group efforts. • • • 
"The people who remember the 1932 vote realize that voting is a big deal, that it can 
change society," says William Hamilton, a Democratic pollster. "But they also have more 
time. They are past the age when they have to go to the PTA or drink Coors in a Western 
bar." 
46. The classic article making this point is McClosky, Hoffmann & O'Hara, Issue Conflict 
and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers, 54 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 406 (1960). The 
most recent corroboration comes from an article in the New York Times by Steven Roberts, 
Rules of Party Playing Desired Role, Poll Finds, July 15, 1984, at 26, col. 1, which notes that 
delegates to the 1984 Democratic convention were considerably more liberal than the mass of the 
Democratic Party. "This contrast is not unique: Activists elected as delegates to national con-
ventions of both parties have usually been closer to the ideological edge than to the middle of 
their party base." Id. at 26, col. 2. 
47. See Beitz, supra note 4, at 133. He quotes Schattschneider's classic comment about the 
"chorus" of political activists (and contributors): it "sings with a strong upper class accent," 
Although some "upper class accent[s]," like those of Stewart Mott or the Kennedy family, may 
speak the language of the less-well-off, we are surely entitled to assume a general congruence 
between the accent and the class bias of the message. 
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are (irresistibly) tempted to add that the very personality of the indi-
vidual is constituted in large part by her own choices of "self-expres-
sion" in these realms of activity; an incursion on those choices would 
therefore be a fundamental denial of individual respect and dignity.48 
It is, of course, one of the basic features of such libertarian approaches 
to the first amendment that any structural concern that one might 
have about the consequences of individual decisionmaking is deni-
grated. Rights are trumps, 49 after all, to be most warmly defended pre-
cisely when the public suffers from their enjoyment. 
It is not surprising that such libertarian theories continue to have 
strong appeal; both normative theory and American history make 
them compelling to many analysts. Yet as Frederick Schauer has 
helpfully insisted, we have scarcely adopted libertarianism as a general 
political or constitutional theory in our polity.50 What we have done 
is to insist, even if not to explain why, that "speech is special" and 
thus immune from the regulation that we complacently accept in other 
realms of our social life. 
The notorious embarrassment, of course, comes from the fact that 
there is no widely accepted analytic differentiation between those ac-
tivities that are unregulable speech acts and those that can indeed be 
constrained by the state. Nowhere is this embarrassment more acute 
than in regard to the regulation of electoral contributions. A common 
defense to first amendment attacks on the validity of spending restric-
tions, for example, is that the political activities sought to be fostered 
by the contributor will be engaged in by persons other than the con-
tributor. Thus, the authors of the Court's per curiam opinion in Buck-
ley thought it relevant that "the transformation of contributions into 
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu-
tor. "51 "Proxy" speech is thus defined as not being one's own activ-
ity.52 For Drew, Common Cause, and the majority of the Court, 
structural concerns entirely obliterate any purported claims of individ-
ual rights. 
There is no explanation, however, of how it is that a person's 
"own" decision that her views (and thus her "self") would be more 
48. See, e.g., Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-92 (1978). 
49. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
50. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 47-67 (1982); Schauer, 
Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1289-93 (1983). 
51. 424 U.S. at 21. See also California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981); Cox, 
Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 62-63 (1980). 
52. See Powe, supra note 9, at 254-64. It is not clear how the "speech" of a newspaper 
publisher can be viewed as anything other than "proxy" speech, given that the publisher almost 
invariably speaks through hired writers and editors. This consideration makes it more perplex-
ing than ever that owners of newspapers are immune from the regulation that can be visited on 
other proxy speakers. See text at notes 32-38 supra. 
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effectively presented in an ad written by a professional "copy" writer is 
any less worthy of respect than a contrary decision to speak in the 
park herself. We as lawyers, after all, do not expect persons to speak 
in their own voice when brought into court. Indeed, most of us believe 
that the right to be spoken for by a lawyer is a fundamental means of 
self-protection, to be regulated only minimally by the state. Why is a 
person not similarly entitled, when addressing the "court of public 
opinion," to hire the very best writers and speakers? 
One need not, of course, accept the libertarian thrust of the last 
(rhetorical) question. As Schauer insists, one very good answer may 
lie in the social harms that unregulated access might present.53 At the 
very least, though, one should recognize that the intuitive perceptions 
that underlie such dubious notions as "proxy speech" (as distinguished 
from one's "own" speech) are themselves in need of analysis rather 
than complacent embrace. 
Let us return then to the proposal sketched above. The central 
difference between it and those endorsed by supporters of Common 
Cause, of course, is that the former seeks to regulate time and the 
latter, money. But, of course, the significance of the distinction be-
tween time and money is debatable. The amount of genuinely "free" 
time one has is clearly a function of money, at least in a capitalist 
society. Those without enough money to support their basic needs 
have no time to waste on politics. Indeed, in regulating time one is 
inevitably regulating on the basis of the distribution of economic re-
sources as well. To the extent that political activists cannot support 
themselves without working in the regular economy, they must be sup-
ported, and one of the functions of political contributions is to provide 
subsistence for those with time, but no money, out of the pocketbooks 
of those with money, but no time. For example, I suspect that many 
college students can engage in political work only because they are 
subsidized by others. Our view of this complex process may depend 
importantly on whether we focus on the individual participation -
presumably something to be encouraged - or instead emphasize the 
role played by the contributor of funds, of whom we may be 
suspicious. 
V 
I have attempted in this brief review to present two difficulties that 
plague anyone who tries to generate a coherent and consistent theory 
justifying the regulation of campaign activity: (1) Assuming that one 
is trying to limit the impact of economic inequality on public debate, 
how does one distinguish, if at all, between the rich in general and 
those particular rich who have invested in the media? Answering this 
53. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 131-48. 
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question, of course, does not determine whether one will regulate or 
not; and (2) Can one who is motivated by egalitarian concerns limit 
her attention only to monetary inequalities? If not, then what are the 
implications for the state's regulation of all of those inequalities that 
characterize everyday life and that may distort our politics in ways 
similar to the distortions presumably generated by the inequalities of 
money? 
In the course of defending strong protection for political speech, 
John Rawls eloquently states: 
Thus as a matter of constitutional doctrine the priority of liberty implies 
that free political speech cannot be restricted unless it can be reasonably 
argued from the specific nature of the present situation that there exists a 
constitutional crisis in which democratic institutions cannot work effec-
tively and their procedures for dealing with emergencies cannot 
operate.54 
Let me offer a slightly amended version of this sentence in which one 
substitutes for the phrase "free political speech" the term "distribution 
of political speech." The sentence reads just as eloquently, but then 
we must confront the fact that Rawls is clearly hostile to the Supreme 
Court's veto in Buckley of wide-ranging regulation of campaign fi-
nance. Can Rawls, or anyone else, adhere to traditional norms of free-
dom of speech, and at the same time support the kinds of regulation 
endorsed by Wright and Drew? 
That no philosopher, including Rawls, can resolve all of the issues 
presented by the regulation of campaign financing only underscores 
the inequity of expecting Drew or Wright in their writings to do any 
better. I certainly have not worked out satisfactory answers to the 
conundrums I outlined above. 
Yet we must recognize the fact that the writings of a journalist like 
Drew are likely to be much more influential than those of academics, 
even one so comparatively well known as Rawls. If we refuse to force 
serious journalists like Drew to confront the implications of their 
ideas, if we refuse to ask of them the same questions that we direct at a 
Rawls - even if we do not expect as deeply considered answers -
both the intellectual dialogue and, ultimately, the conduct of our pub-
lic affairs may be the losers .. 
54. Rawls, supra note 9, at 70. 
